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SOCIAL VALUES

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FEELING AS AN ELEMENT IN ACTIVITY

In an earlier article, published in this *Journal* and in the *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society*, I discussed the false rôle which has been assigned to the feelings in sociology. By what seems to me a very serious error the feelings (spoken as of "the social forces") are regarded as the sufficient causes of social activities, so that sociological explanation is made to consist in referring actions to motives. I wish in this article to discuss what seems to me to be the true importance of feelings for sociology, namely their importance as the means, not of explaining, but of evaluating, the whole.

I am now to speak, not of social "valuations" or judgments of worth (which are a special kind of social activity), but of social values, or the elements in experience upon which such judgments are passed, the subjects of which valuations supply the predicate, and which are not a special kind of social activity but an element or quality found in activities of every kind.

Our actions are like a shield, one side of which is exposed to the world, the other pressed against the heart. The inner side of activity is desire and satisfaction and pain. Even the thought of an action is itself an activity with its lining of desire and satisfaction. When outward circumstances hinder our actions, still the inner activity may continue like the straining of a man in chains, and though it cannot show its outer side in overt deeds, yet its inner side be hot and vivid or cold and heavy to our own passionate or dogged consciousness. This mere thought of action is itself an action which is not wholly robbed of satisfaction so long as it is a thought of completer action that the future may allow; but when it is the thought of completer action that can never be, then deserted by satisfaction desire alone becomes despair. But our normal activity rushes on at the same time both tingling

with desire and warm with the glow of satisfaction. Without activity there is neither desire nor satisfaction, but only stagnation, stupor, death.

Desire and satisfaction both are phases of one element, the inner essence of our activity. They are one as water and steam are one, for the inner essence of our activity may be frozen to icy despair, or ebullient in satisfaction, or dissipated in satiety. Therefore we may be glad that we are capable of many kinds of activity, and that while some are volatile others simmer steadily. The steady pleasures are commonly and normally mingled with desire. The immediate gratification of every wish is not the way either to greatest satisfaction or to greatest strength of character. Hence the oft-learned lesson that parents who grant all the wishes of their children without any corresponding effort of the children, both spoil them and rob them. It is hard for the well-to-do city dweller to withhold enough, and to exact enough for the zestful happiness and the moral health of his children, though he should rejoice in his power to give abundantly. Justice is a finer, as well as a harder thing, even in the home, than mere impulsive affection which alternates indulgence with reproaches equally exaggerated and unjust. Mother Nature is wiser in her gifts and her exactions, until she is overcome by the inventions of her children. Then nations sink into discontent and moral anemia, unless they have developed other than mere physical wants, that keep them still desiring and zestfully striving.

There is no such thing as passive experience; all experience is active. What we call passive experience is that experience the conditions for which are supplied by others or by Nature. When you strike me my experience is active though conditioned by your action. If I suffer in silence the silence may cost me more intense action than would a violent outburst of resentment. When we are talking of experience we are talking of psychic action not muscular action, and all experience is action.

COMMODITIES HAVE NO INDEPENDENT VALUE

What do we live for? For money, men answer. But this is false; no rational being ever lived for money. Money has no value in itself. All value is in action, in experience, in life.

Robinson Crusoe carried away the bits of old iron, ropes, and pieces of sails from the wrecked ship that served him so well, but would he carry away barrels of Spanish gold? The sails could make a tent to cover him and give him the experience that is conditioned by dry and comfortable warmth in spite of rain; with iron he could smite and hew and toil with zest, and having toiled could eat and live to toil again, but gold is of no value unless it can yield experience. What would be the value of a gift of a million dollars in gold if the possessor could not show any part of it to anyone? If he could show it, it might give him a silly pride, and pleasure in the envy of others, which would be an experience, and experience has value but gold has not. Or even if he could not show it, if he had earned and saved it that achievement might make him proud, and then his pride would be an experience and as such would have its value; but gold, even a million pounds of it, that he did not accumulate and cannot parade—that is not the means of an experience—has none. Gold, as money, has its normal value because one can get rid of it for something that one really wants.

But any *thing* for which one can exchange it has no more value in itself than the gold had. Suppose one exchange a dollar of his gold for good beef and potatoes. They are not good in themselves, and if he have no digestion or appetite, or have just dined, they may even be a cause of vexation and disgust. It is the conscious satisfaction that one gets in eating with appetite, and from having eaten, that has value. For value can exist only in consciousness. It can never be seen, or weighed, and it can be measured only by comparison with some other satisfaction as imponderable as itself.

No material thing is good in itself, or good in any ultimate sense, it is only good *for* something, and that something for which it is good is always a conscious experience. Conscious experience alone is good in itself.

This is not saying that what is only good *for* something is of trifling account. On the contrary, since experience for which things are good, of which things are necessary conditions, is itself so good, is indeed the whole and only good of which we have any

knowledge, therefore things, just in proportion as they are good for experience, are valuable and important; only their value or importance is wholly secondary and derivative, it depends on the fact that they are good for experience, they have no value in and of themselves. Therefore things can never be the ultimate end of rational endeavor, but only a means to an end.

There is no economic motive. We are often told that the need of food and clothing is the economic motive, and keeps the wheels of industry revolving. But does the millionaire return daily to his office in spite of his physician's warning, until at length nervous prostration stops him, because driven by the need of food and clothing? The interest on the bonds in his safety deposit box, if he stopped business at once, would feed and clothe a regiment. No, he goes to his office because he has schemes on foot upon the accomplishment of which his heart is set, he is in the midst of activities that he cannot bear to suspend, his sense of power and achievement in these activities intoxicates him, his determination is set upon them, and it is like suicide to unclamp it, and he commits suicide in pursuit of it. He goes back to his office as the football player with a broken rib takes his place in the line. One thinks as little of his food and clothing as the other. American men make money as American boys play marbles in spring, baseball in summer, and football in autumn. The rich man toiling for more, as a rule, is simply trying to run up a high score at the national game.

The motives to economic work are as various as the desires of man and as manifold as man's capacities for desirable experience. A man may engage in economic work for the admiration of the spectators, his fellow-townsmen, or for the sense of power, the pleasure of "workmanship," or the mere sense of possession, or in order that he may pay for food to fill his stomach, for books to feed his mind, for music to solace his soul, for the support of religion which affords him experiences now and hoped for experiences in eternity. There is no human experience in the promotion of which material things can be used as a means that does not afford a motive for economic work. There is no specific economic motive since wealth is in no sense an end in itself; but every human

desire is an economic motive in so far as its fulfilment calls for the use of material things as means.

The motive that impels men to work is often a kind of *purée* of all desires, a generalized notion that desirable experiences are possible to the man who has money. The kind of desirable experience which stands out oftenest in his imagination as obtainable by the expenditure of what he earns depends on whether he is a gourmand, a libertine, a sport, a lover aspiring to marriage and home, an amateur of art, of music, or of books, a social climber, a political aspirant, a religious zealot, or what not!

Every man engaged in economic work, in so far as he is impelled by any rational desire, is impelled by desire for some imponderable psychic thing, that is, for some experience which is to be realized by himself or by others; but not all human action is impelled by any rational motive. Instinctive action is not, but is impelled by a blind prompting toward a deed that serves an uncalculated end. However, man is little impelled by instinct to his economic work, as the savage proves, but at first he mistakenly thinks that Eden is idleness and labor a curse. Neither is purely imitative action impelled by any rational motive, but it is a mere response of the sensitive machinery of man's psychophysical organism to an external stimulus.

Thus the man who makes business his career may or may not be guided by a rational aim. He may be so poorly educated, even in spite of a diploma and degree, that he has not discovered the real goods of life, is not acquainted and familiarized with, or adjusted to its desirable experiences, does not recognize and appreciate in their due proportion the values which are attainable. He may have engaged in business imitatively, because in his home and among his acquaintances there prevailed a judgment, by which talk and practice were guided, to the effect that business was the natural occupation and goal of mankind. Such an individual may be without any rational aim in life. A whole society, engrossed in business, may be without any adequate and balanced appreciation of life's aims, of the real values of life which are to be attained or lost, and may rush on in the imitative pursuit

of "goods" which are in fact good only as means to ends which are neither properly estimated nor understood.

Probably the statement that a society may lack any rational judgment of life's aims should have been more strongly put: probably there never was a society in which the popular group judgments, that each individual inhaled with his breath, embodied a rational conception of the aims of life. Moreover we are all imitative, and only occasionally anything else. Only now and then do we make for ourselves estimates of the unseen realities of experience. Therefore in a society whose members in general judge each other and themselves by the number of marbles in their pouches, or the number of scalps at their belts, or the number of skulls over their doors, or the number of dollars in their bank accounts, even one who does not play that particular game may find it hard not to estimate his own success by the same standard, and impossible to prevent his neighbors from doing so, and more or less difficult to convince them that he is at heart pursuing any higher aim.

It is not wrong to play the game of business, provided it does not supplant worthier purposes and occupations, and our work may have play interest as activity and competition, while at the same time having a further aim. But business may not only be what war once was, the game in which strong men wreak themselves and compete for glory, but also an intelligent means of all good ends and even a method of service, entirely worthy of the exercise of great powers.

Not only would the character of business be elevated but the joy of it would be increased if this last fact, the fact that business is properly a method of service, were more considered. Why does a man run a shoe factory? To make money. But does it occur to him that he runs it to make shoes, that to make shoes is an indispensable public service without which misery, disease, deaths, and the impeding of our whole civilized life would ensue, and that after forty years of making excellent shoes, though no money had been accumulated, he would have achieved a success? Every wage-earner deserves to share in this motive and this satis-

faction. That manufacturer may well have had it who when a visitor remarked: "After twenty years' experience you ought to be able to make a pretty good hammer," replied: "No, we never make a pretty good hammer, we make the best hammers in the world."

The "captain of industry" performs a service, not only in the output which he places on the market, but also in that he organizes the lives of his fellow-workers. It may or it may not be that he is abler or better than all of those working under him, still it is essential that some one occupy the directive position, and by no means all can do so with success. He who can, performs a great service to all the rest. He ought to rejoice in this also, and make the excellent performance of this service a chief part of his conscious aim. Here as among warriors, *noblesse oblige*, power is opportunity and responsibility. An employer has no more right to consider only his own profit in the business in which others also spend their days, than a captain has, like Napoleon, to consider only his own glory in warfare in which others risk their lives. Laborers and employers are necessary to each other; all industry is co-operative in fact, even if it is not and perhaps cannot be co-operatively managed, and that the power to manage is in the hands of one does not nullify the rights of the rest.

With these things in mind the business man will realize that he may attain the highest success though he accumulate no more money than the teacher and the scientist. In these callings, and in others that might be named, there are men who regard the money that they earn as a by-product of their work and not its main purpose, a necessary by-product without which the work could not continue, nor their own proper satisfactions be secured, but still not the main product of the work; these men would not leave their task though assured of double the financial returns in an occupation that had no aim but money. The business man, whose sole and ultimate purpose is to get from the public and from his laborers the biggest profits, exhibits disregard of the true aims of business, namely the uses to which his profits or earnings can be put, the serviceableness of his product to the consumers, and the usefulness of his leadership in the organization

of industry; and, further, a business which yields profits without furnishing to the public any utility is related to proper business as piracy is related to the merchant marine. It is a foolish social conventionality that allows a man's success to be measured by income alone, and his business to be treated as if it were a useless game with no purpose but the score. Business is a far worthier thing than that. The amount and character of the product, the level of wages paid, and the profits must all be regarded, in order to have a just or truthful measure of business success, and the third, when excessive, may even be an evidence of failure.

THE MEANS TO LIFE

Human life may be said to contain five different kinds of desire and satisfaction which are rational ends of endeavor, and there are two kinds of means which may be employed in promoting those ends, namely work and material goods.

Of the two kinds of means the first, then, is work, or more broadly, conduct, that is, activity put forth, not merely for the satisfaction which the activity itself contains as an experience, but also in part or wholly as a means or condition of some further experience. Concerning work as it exists for the worker, or conduct, it is to be noted that since it is a human experience it may be good as well as good for something. The words good or bad as ordinarily applied to conduct, just as when applied to any other means, have not the same signification as when applied to experience regarded as an end in itself. Good conduct as such is only relatively good, that is, good as a means to some ulterior experience, and it may be either good and desirable or hard and bad in itself. Good conduct is that which, even if hard and bad in itself, yet on the whole and in the long run, serves to increase the net sum of good experience. The goodness of conduct is defined by reference to its results, but that other goodness, the goodness of results, cannot be defined in terms of anything beyond itself; it can no more be defined than red or the sound of a cornet can be defined; it is ultimate, but like those sensations it is vividly known in experience. Each of us has had enough experience that for consciousness was good, and enough that for consciousness was bad, to

know what good and bad are, and to find inducement or deterrence in the words of others who tell us of experiences which they have found good or bad. Activities, that is experiences, which for consciousness are good constitute the only conceivable ultimate good.

The second kind of means is composed of material things, goods and chattels, inanimate objects or animals, and men who are enslaved or exploited in violation of Kant's principle of ethics that "man is never to be treated as if he were a means only, but always as being an end in himself." The acquisition of these means and their adaptation to human uses is economic production, though that phrase is of late sometimes given a wider and less consistent meaning.

The distinction between land and capital is, for our purpose, relatively unimportant; the fundamental division is between work and things. Work is never a mere commodity, it is an experience. It is always a part of a life, which is to be regarded as an end in itself. All other means are things. Economists have laid great stress upon the difference between the direct and the indirect employment of material means, that is, between "consumption goods" and "capital" used in producing consumption goods. A similar distinction exists in regard to work; for as things may be used to produce things, so work may be applied to eliciting and adapting the work of others. Work of that sort is organizing work, method in such work is the art of organization, and capacity for such work is organizing or administrative ability. Organization on the greatest scale is politics or government.

Each kind of means may be used in securing the other, that is work in securing commodities or commodities in securing work. Commodities so used are commonly called "wages."

Wages include two elements which it is highly important to distinguish: necessary or compulsory or what at times deserve to be called exploitive wages, without the payment of which the co-operation of the laborers could not be secured; and differential wages, that is a return over and above necessary wages but as a rule ultimately paid out of the product of the labor of the wage earners. There is no economic law to compel the payment of

differential wages. Generally speaking it depends upon the action of the manager, in his capacity as the agent of secondary distribution, that is distribution of the proceeds resulting from the sale of output, among the participants in the production of output. There is no ethical claim to property which is clearer than the claim of the laborer to differential wages, whenever the productivity of his labor is such as to yield more than the necessary wages, interest, rent, and wages of superintendence, the amounts of all four of which are approximately determined by economic laws. The manager is as justly entitled to differential wages as any laborer, though not in excess of the proportion indicated by the proportion of necessary wages of superintendence to the total necessary wages of all the laborers who co-operated with him. The salaries of hired managers often include a large differential above their necessary wages. Favoritism to a hired manager which gives him differential wages while denying them to other laborers is unjust. Not every industry is productive enough to yield any differential wages. If distribution were just, the interest of the laborer in the efficiency of management and in the productivity of all the labor employed would be as great proportionally, as the interest of the manager himself. Justice in the distribution of differential wages may be voluntary on the part of the employer, or may be compelled by the bargaining power of the united laborers, or by law.

THE FIVE ULTIMATE VALUES

Having said so much about the two great means of human satisfaction, labor and goods, we now come to our main question: What are the five kinds of desire and satisfaction that can be realized in human experience, that *are* human experience as it exists, not for the observer or bystander, but for the person experiencing it, and that in their proper union and harmony constitute the good of life?

The first class of good human experiences are physical, and represented by the comfort of warmth and ease, the exhilaration of muscular movement, and the gratification of bodily appetites.

All our experience has a physical basis, but in experience of this

first kind a material excitant is usually in evidence, and the physiological character of the experience itself is obvious, instead of being concealed in the minute and hidden functionings of the brain and nerves and interior organs.

Here as well as anywhere that which we pronounce good is an experience existing in consciousness, a psychic reality, of which the physical is only a means or condition; but it is bound up with sensation, that is psychic reality of the least evolved and differentiated sort, and may contain little or even none at all of the more evolved cognitive elements, perception and judgment, which are found in other good experiences.

It is customary to cry down these physical pleasures, and to call them low and coarse. This is in part because they do engage those powers of man which are less evolved, and are shared by lower orders of animals. The sensuous pleasures are however a real good by no means to be despised, and they are ennobled in man, when with the exercise of sensuous powers there is mingled the exercise of man's other and higher powers, and when there is allowed nothing in the exercise of the former which violates the latter or prevents the realization of the whole sphere of good human possibilities.

A second reason for the general practice of decrying the physical pleasures, a practice much declined since the days of our too austere forefathers, is the fact that the human individual is far more certain to be a craving animal than to be an aspiring soul, the powers later evolved often compete precariously for their due place in his attention with the basal beast in him, and need to have on their side all the reinforcement of social suggestion, lest they be crowded out and overwhelmed and man remain a beast. And civilized man cannot be a good beast, he must either be far more and better than a mere beast or else fail miserably.

Some say that a third reason for decrying physical pleasures is that the desire for them gives brutal intensity to economic competition; but physical gratifications are not extremely expensive until they become aesthetic; and it is a false standard of social and personal success, more than desire for physical gratification, that overstimulates the pursuit of wealth.

Physical pleasures are by no means to be omitted from an enumeration of the classes into which the real goods of human experience are divided, but they are coupled with an awful capacity for physical pain.

Man as a mere animal is utterly unfitted to live in a "pleasure economy." Under a "pain economy" where man's activities are mostly directed against discomfort, and hunger, and bodily peril, he may do fairly well with little heed to higher interests, he may secure the coarse and powerful physical gratifications at their strongest, and in war against want and pain may feel the zest of bodily and mental activity; he may taste other pleasures also, he may exult in personal prowess and the admiration of his fellows, practice by force of physical necessity and social pressure the simpler virtues, and feel an untaught gladness in the beauty of field and sky. But let him once triumph over Nature, let him become rich and the attainment of physical pleasure easy, and its pursuit yields him neither zest in action, nor pride and honor in achievement, and even physical pleasure, in spite of luxury and artful stimulation, weakens and palls, and his body itself, or that of his offspring, if he have any, sinks in decay. Man, when once he becomes well to do, must care for other than bodily satisfactions; when the attainment of satisfaction, not the avoidance of pain, becomes his predominating motive, he must have discovered other satisfactions than those of ease and appetite, and always he must have a goal that evokes his powers, for life is action, and there is no passivity for man but death, and though the death may be slow it is pain.

Second may be named the aesthetic pleasures. The experience of beauty is at least as various as physical pleasure. At one time its chief character is tenderness, at another it is exaltation, yet it is one distinct class of experience which we know in our own consciousness, and the presence of which we evince to others, and which we with conscious purpose evoke in others.

Sensuous beauty, the pleasure in color, line and sound for their own sake, are as dependent upon material excitants, and as divorced from developed intellectual elements playing an essential part in the same experience, as are the "physical" grati-

fictions. They are physiological responses as truly as the pleasure in food. How far we share them with the animals it is not our present province to discuss, but they are the possession of untaught men, though in varying degrees and subject to increase by the social suggestion of aesthetic judgments, and by the sympathetic radiation of aesthetic feeling.

The beauty of Nature affords perhaps the most universal of aesthetic experiences, both because the beauty of Nature is everywhere, at least in the sky, and because some responsiveness to Nature's beauty is common to practically all men. Not all can feel the beauty of a symphony or a sonnet, but few, if any, among normal human beings, are insensible to the beauty of dawn and sunset and the stars. Of this the folklore of savages does not lack evidence. Wordsworth did not "reveal" the beauty of flowers. Little children of the city slums feel it as well as he, though they cannot express it in verse, and South-sea savages twine flowers in their hair. At the same time no student of comparative sociology can overlook the power of social radiation to heighten aesthetic experiences even in the appreciation of Nature, and to create artificial and fantastic tastes, through the prestige of the aesthetic mentor and the influence of the mass of society over the likes and dislikes of its individual members.

In civilized society, except among the wretched class, the beauty of the home stands next to the beauty of Nature. It is largely due to a sweet familiarity, the positive of which homesickness is the negative, the same principle which enhances the beauty of a familiar quotation, or favorite song. Visible adaptation to cherished human uses is one principle of beauty, and it is heightened by evidences of actual use. The unceasing labor that preserves the cleanliness and order of the home is essentially a work of art, done for beauty's sake as truly as the practice of any other art, and in the aggregate contributing to the enjoyment of beauty at least as much as any other art. At the same time every other art combines with it to enhance the beauty of the home, as all arts combine with religion to reinforce its power.

The beauty or lack of beauty of the human person and personality are inextricably mingled, now reinforcing, now counter-

acting each other, and beauty of the one sort triumphing over ugliness of the other. Beauty of personality, or moral beauty, is everywhere to be seen, even though never perfect—the beauty of an unspoiled child, of a man as sturdy in character and intelligence as in body, of a woman worthy of that name, or of serene, magnanimous, and dignified old age.

It is likely to be the case that we justly appraise only our brief or unusual pleasures, which give us a shock of contrast, and fail to appreciate or even to name those which give light and warmth and color to the successive hours of our common days until they are cut off and we find how cold and dark it would be without them. If it were always day we should have the cheer of the light, but should take it for granted, and our experience would scarcely inform us that it is the light that gives us this cheer. And so in making an inventory of life's values it is well to emphasize the beauty of Nature, home, and people.

Of the aesthetic experiences which are ministered to by the arts usually called fine, one may remark with satisfaction that the American people have begun to admit that the promotion of these values is work worthy of real men having the manliest gifts; though it is still to be feared that a Michael Angelo, or Leonardo, or Beethoven born among us would be in danger of going into business.

Of these arts literature and music are the first to be appreciated by a new nation, because the former is diffused by the press, and the latter by the tours of good musical performers. The painter, sculptor, and architect do not take with them, wherever they go, their revelations of beauty. The printed picture now aids in the diffusion of taste for these arts, yet as a rule, in a new country it is only in the wealthy city that the original productions of these arts can be seen.

The third great class of values which life contains is made up of satisfactions that accompany the active exercise of the intellectual powers, the satisfaction of interest, the joy of comprehension, the zest of mental application rewarded by perceptions and insights. This is the distinctive delight of the reader, though in his case it is complicated with nearly every other kind of pleasure, as he imagines scenes and experiences portrayed and enters into

comradeship with the author and his characters. The pleasures of curiosity lure on the traveler also. Curiosity is as natural an appetite as hunger, and its gratification is a pleasure, often keener than that derived from food, and capable of being indefinitely more prolonged. The amateur scientist also partakes of intellectual pleasure, he reads Nature's own book, and looks upon all living things, material events, and even the dead but storied rocks with eyes that have been touched and opened. And the professional scientist is in the truest sense no less an amateur. Even those of us who are somewhat dull and ignorant, find wherever we go, something about which to question and speculate and wonder, and feed our hungry wits; it may be the interpretation of our neighbors' movements, the study of a stranger's physiognomy and dress, judging the contents of a package by the evidence afforded by its outward appearance, or solving the puzzles in the weekly paper. The pathos of ignorance is that the ravenous mind feeds upon husks instead of bread. Education makes life a feast. In our day some look upon education merely or chiefly as a means of making money—a means to a means. It is that, but it is chiefly an introduction to life's values, that without it would be largely missed, not intellectual values only but all those that escape the mere animal man. It is entering upon our heritage as sons of man and heirs of the ages.

Fourth among life's values are the social experiences, experiences of a peculiar character and flavor, which are conditioned by our thoughts of our associates. For intensity and permanence, in the case of most of us, they exceed all of the preceding three combined. To be wholly satisfying our thoughts of our associates must include thoughts of their thoughts or feelings about us. Imagine, if one can, a human being never noticed by any other human being, never receiving an answering smile, or greeting word or gesture, to show that his presence was observed, who, whether alone or in the crowd, was equally non-existent for his kind, as if forever wearing the garment of invisibility. No physical deprivation would compare with such a fate. Absolute isolation, if prolonged, causes hunger for this natural satisfaction which may become unbearable and induce insanity. Yet in isolation we may have

some social pleasures, for we are not wholly deprived of thoughts about associates, but only of the new and vivid ones which their presence would occasion. To pass from a community where one has been surrounded by friends and the marks of respect and esteem, to dwell in the midst of strangers, is like falling from a sunny shore into the North Atlantic. And what shall be said of one who suddenly finds the cordiality of friends diminished, silence, averted looks, suspicion, contempt? We expand under the favor of our associates like flowers in the sun; joy blooms and all our powers bear fruit; but their indifference blights, and withers us like a frost.

What is so precious as the friendship of one comrade whom we like, whose judgment we trust, who knows us thoroughly and likes, approves, and trusts us, what else is the occasion of so deep a comfort and joy, and what advantage is there in exchange for which we could afford to lose the trust of such a friend. Fame is the acquaintance, or esteem, or friendship, of a great number. As cold esteem it may be of the highest; as friendship it is likely to be thinly diluted.

Our personality is largely the fruit of social contacts. Conscious life is adjustment to a psychic milieu furnished by our kind, as animal life is adjustment to a physical environment which meets its needs; and it is scarcely too much to say that our higher and more constant satisfaction depends upon social relations as completely as animal pleasure depends upon material conditions. Probably the desire to love and be loved, to esteem and to be esteemed, to be thought successful and admirable, and the corresponding satisfactions, are the heartfelt side of more human striving and realization, than physical, intellectual, and aesthetic pleasures combined. Even the outcast criminal boasts to his pals of his success in crime, and the tramp prizes his reputation among tramps as a successful beggar. Physical desires are universal and urgent, but they are soon satisfied and even satiated, not so the appetite for social satisfaction. Whatever achievement friends and associates reward with approval and honor men will strive for. By its approvals society can turn its members to follow with eager feet any path it may select, and for this reward it may

have any service up to the very limit of human possibility. That is a wise society in which the mass knows what to frown upon and what to honor—none yet has been so wise as that.

The fifth form of value realized in experience is that which accompanies one's thought of himself. This we may call the personal satisfaction, for it is the sense of one's own personality. It has its roots in social experience.¹ We who pass judgments upon our associates are compelled by the logical consistency of the human mind more or less to judge ourselves by similar standards; having called another a villain for a certain act, straightway to view the same act in one's self is likely to produce a twinge, and having called another glorious for a certain act, one aspires to like action and commends himself if he perform it. We all are born into a society in which social interaction has equipped each adult with developed standards, which judge us and teach us to judge ourselves and others.

We find it hard or impossible to think well of ourselves when all others think ill of us. But we live in many groups, the home, the school, the shop, the newspaper world, each has its standards; the vicious gang, the boarding-house company, a single powerful personality representative of another circle than any in which we usually move, the characters in a story-book—we are impressed by the standards and sentiments of each; and concerning each we often ask half-consciously: What would these think of me? What would my sweetheart think? What would my boy think if he should see that in his father? What would my dead mother think, whose standards differed from those of my present associates? What would God think? And since the social contacts from which we derive our standards of self-judgment are so numerous and so diverse as to impose on us opposite requirements, we cannot be simultaneously governed by them all, but are compelled at any given moment to select some one course of conduct, making it *our* way, and its standard of judgment our standard of self-judgment.

The personal ideal may be shifting, and vague at points, wanting in standards applying to some situations, and in part irrational and absurd; but in no individual who is the product of any normal

¹ Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, chaps. i, ii.

social life, however primitive, is it absent, nor are its promptings at all points lacking in definiteness and urgency. I do not mean that every human individual, even in the most advanced society, has consciously formed and chosen a personal ideal. It may be a mere natural product, the result of reaction between inborn tendencies and external suggestions. But if the environment has been fortunate and the education wisely conducted, the personal ideal represents a working adjustment between the various interests of the individual and claims of society upon him, as they are understood by the group that has chiefly influenced him. What I am calling the personal ideal includes not only moral requirements but also ambitions and all standards of personal success and worth. It is the concrete concept of a satisfactory self. The individual measures himself by it when he dresses and looks in the mirror, when he has the feel of himself in company, when he plays a game at which he has some pretensions to skill, when he reviews a speech that he has made or a bargain that he has driven. His self-thought, if tolerably definite and stable, is the most central and determining thing in his character. It dominates his deliberate choices, and even in the busy hours where absorption in objective aims drives it below the threshold of consciousness, if he lives an organized life, it still is determining the direction and force of his activity.

We differ greatly as to the honesty with which we select our self-thought on its merits, and the deliberation and constancy with which we cherish any chosen standard. This honesty and constancy, or the lack of them, mark the path of our ascent or our descent.

We tend to cherish a self-thought that does not make us too uncomfortable by its exactions. Many experiment with ideals that prove too high for comfort. When their personal reaction upon some situation disagrees with their ideal, they say to themselves that under the peculiar circumstances under which they acted the ideal was not binding, or else that the ideal was impracticable anyway for real life as conditions now are, and comfort themselves with the opinion that most persons would have done no no better than they. Others are too honest for this, and here is

the supreme test of honesty. They admit the real character of their own act, make no apology for it and still cling to their ideal. This honest and valiant clinging to an ideal too high for easy attainment is the virtue of humility. Humility is not cringing. Only a soul of the toughest fiber can keep his humility in this true sense. The pain he suffers at the discovery of his own inadequacy, the revulsion against the hated act, and the desperate clutching of the standard of his resolve, are repentance, which alone enables such a soul to forgive himself. And such repentance resets his organic being with new tensions, so that in spite of the power of habit, strengthened by the last repetition, the natural consequence may be that he is less likely than before his fall to repeat the act repented of, and though habit and hereditary tendency combine against him he may at length conquer, and fulfil his ideal. For the key to the nature of man's psycho-physical organism is its adaptation to function under the stimulation of ideas. To have his idea of the self which his whole nature, when freed from clamorous solicitations of circumstance, approves, clearly enough and often enough before his mind so that it gives the set to his habitual conscious, and even subconscious, tensions, is to approach that ideal as nearly as his nature allows. And the extent to which man can respond to an idea, and be transformed into its fulfilment, is the supreme miracle of Nature.

But this implies the deliberate constancy as well as the honesty, which are the central soundness of personality.

Constancy is wholly a matter of attention. The dishonest mind winces from the facts, its attention fades away from unwelcome realities. All life is determined by attention; and the strong man who knows that this is so will see to it that the inspiring summoning thoughts are daily brought before the mind. The man who does not pause in the morning of every day, or at other stated times, to call to mind his chosen thoughts and aims, and who does not seek the environment that presents them to consciousness, but lets his attention be filled with whatever chance suggests—the morning paper, the chat at the club, the sights of the street, the routine of business, is like a farmer who lets his field be windsown, instead of selecting the seed; his ground will

be covered with growths and will bear some flowers and a little fruit, but mainly weeds unless the winds blow to him over the well-tilled fields of neighbors. Such people may seem as respectable or as despicable as their surroundings, but are in either case equally devoid of self-determined personality. In one environment they might be toughs or sneak thieves, slatterns or prostitutes, while in another they speak proper English, wear clean linen, and practice conventional morality. They are drifting derelicts, rotten hulks if environment so shape them, or with fresh paint and glittering brass by better fortune, but in either case without engine or steering gear, floating forever aimlessly or entering some harbor or crushed upon the rocks, as tide and wind determine. There are others whose nature reacts strongly to certain standards and stimulations, and holds to the course thus defined in spite of counter allurements. Their conduct is not determined from moment to moment by present opportunities and influences, nor even by old habits, but by an inner set of the organism, established and maintained by attention to an idea and purpose that is cherished and remembered notwithstanding the changes of circumstances, or with the aid of circumstances of their own choosing.

The only unpardonable sin is not to have, and keep before the mind an honest ideal. An honest ideal is one that its possessor adopts and holds with his eyes open, open to all that he can see of life's present and future meaning to himself and to all who are to be affected by his life. Such honesty and constancy require the courage and strength not to flinch from looking at one part of the truth while gazing at another part as if it were all, nor to let the ideal fade away into the background of consciousness; they imply the humility that admits the evil of one's own evil, and the good of the good unattained, and makes each error the occasion of fresh resolve. The man of integrity is true to his ideal, that is to his deliberate and honest view of what his life should be, just as the needle is true to the pole, which may oscillate indeed, but turns continually toward its star.

A schedule of life's pains and satisfactions would by no means be complete without including reference to that peculiar experience which is felt in the pain of self-mutilation and the peace of moral

consistency. There are satisfactions and there are pleasures. Satisfaction is the deep strong current of life, pleasures are its ripples. One may have pleasures and never know satisfaction, but have instead only the termination of pleasure in satiety, and the unrest of those who have never discovered life's deeper, fuller values. Satisfaction is for all who can frame and pursue intentions to which their whole nature consents as good enough to be the measure of their life, and *the pursuit* of which is in itself, a well-spring of satisfaction, and waters into bloom and fruit all other joys, in their due place and measure. When the realization forces itself upon the mind that one's action does not correspond to the approved self-thought, when some errant impulse has defied the cherished judgment centrally enthroned, and forced the admission: "I am not that which I thought I was and meant to be, but something other, which I disapprove," when there is a breach between one's judgment and one's conduct, a hiatus in one's personality, then there is wretchedness; but conformity and unity between conduct and the thought of life, the thought that is reaffirmed and approved whenever the whole nature asserts itself, and acts are viewed in their entirety—not when one clamorous impulse drowns all the rest and one single fragment of man's nature leads him captive and he is dazed by the present importunity of external occasion and reason utters faint protests from the farther rim of consciousness, but conformity and unity between conduct and the thought of life that stands forth when no external occasion clamors and the untroubled judgment holds in balanced regard all the interests of life, the concept of one's own life which each calls his better self, the experience of this conformity has a value that cannot be omitted from the inventory of the good of life—it is peace, it is moral health; without it one may have pleasures, as one sick or maimed may enjoy dainties brought to his bedside, but not the zest of sound life. Here is a kind of satisfaction wholly different from our enjoyment of eating or any physical experience, or our delight in intellectual interest and comprehension, or our appreciation of the beautiful, or our gladness in loving another or in being loved, respected, admired, or applauded. The applause and approval of others may be turned

to bitterness by the absence of this other satisfaction of self-approval, and great as our pleasure in applause is wont to be, we value it lightly if at all when we are applauded for that which we do not value ourselves. I have pointed out the intimate relationship between the personal satisfaction and social approval, and we should not forget how largely our standards of self-judgment grow out of the approvals and disapprovals that have been expressed by those who influence us, and how largely our self-approval is strengthened or weakened by the judgment that others pass upon us. Yet our standards of self-judgment, however derived, are our own after we have formed them, and the experience of self-approval is so distinct from the experience of social approval that it may incite one to stand *contra mundum*, rather than violate his own soul. It does incite every righteous man to stand against world, flesh, and devil. It is so distinct from pleasure in social approval that, perverted in the stubborn or erratic man, it leads him to defy the judgment of others for the sheer pleasure of getting a pungent self-sense. It sustains the thinker, at times the most solitary of men, in an honesty that may compel him to sacrifice agreement with his associates and the consolation of approval and companionship of both the God of his fathers and of men, so that some, facing that hateful loneliness, have walked out into it and dwelt there, for a time at least, in the belief that reason required it, and that to cling to the cherished belief would be the dishonesty of wilful self-deception, and to flinch from carrying to their logical conclusion the processes of thought would be the abandonment of their own integrity.

It may be that not many in a thousand would be prompted by this motive to stand against the world, but it is not true that the presence of this motive, in some degree, is rare. Every street boy who says to himself, "I wouldn't be so mean," has it. And though we cozen ourselves into the acceptance of easy standards, the mordant regret will now and then be felt, as we catch glimpses of the self we "might have been." Indeed our self-deception consists largely in retaining only those parts of the ideal that we find it easy to obey while denying the validity of hard requirements; thus we are seldom left—even the worst of us—without

some remnants of righteousness, and, far from being totally depraved, the demand for goodness competes with the other urgencies of our nature.

Moreover, it would be absurd to imagine that the gratified self-sense comes only in connection with the rare heroic experiences of life. It comes with conscious sincerity and right intention in the commonest day.

Still further, as already pointed out, it is not the peculiar accompaniment of moral excellence alone. It is the sense of power, for which all that is strong in us hungers, like every other craving of our natures, when indulged in disregard of other values realizable by ourselves or others, it becomes dangerous, in proportion to its strength as a motive. It gives power to every ambition, whether base or noble. As desire for wealth may prompt to theft instead of thrift, so this may prompt to mere self-aggrandizement in disregard of social values. It is the sense of every power and every excellence to which we aspire. Of all satisfactions it is the most constant and reliable, and the least subject to the tyranny of circumstances. In it the strong nature of the stoic takes refuge against all vicissitudes. One lives always with the self that one sincerely and consistently chooses. In small and great activities the self-sense gives color to an experience. The player winning his game, or stiffly holding against a superior antagonist, the tidy housewife, the carpenter surveying the perfect joint which he has made, as well as the legislator who has refused a bribe have the satisfaction of an acceptable self. The ditcher may have a thought of himself as a ditcher which puts into his toil a glow of idealistic satisfaction, as real as that felt by the artist. It is present in every sort of worthy lifework, and in a degree, in every activity of man, not of work only but also of play, which he approves as a part of that concatenated system of activities which he recognizes as his living self.

The folly of vanity consists not in appreciating one's own more trivial excellences, but in appreciating them disproportionately. Vanity is the trivial lightness which is uplifted by slight matters and indifferent to weighty ones. And vanity is commonly associated with petty injustice in the preference of that which is one's

own and the disparagement of that which is another's. The disparagement of another's excellence is one of two poles of meanness, of which the other is the hypocritical humility which pretends indifference to one's own excellence. It is absurd to ask men to value excellence everywhere except in themselves. Virtue is always proud and will not stoop. But it is always humble in the sense above defined; it sees the ideal shining ahead and counts itself not to have attained. It compares itself with the ideal, the good that should be striven for, and not with other men.

The fact that an exhilarating self-sense may be had in common work—by the ditcher and the carpenter—is emphasized by one of the most helpful discussions in this field,¹ which goes so far as to say that the economic motive, or wealth experience, is the joy of the workman who shapes material things to human uses. If the view expressed in earlier paragraphs is correct, there is no specific economic motive but appetite for the self-respect that comes of capable work, for the social applause that follows business success, and every human desire, the satisfaction of which requires the employment of material means fashioned by labor is an economic motive; but according to Professor Small the joy of productive labor upon material things is the wealth interest. In that view the wealth experience is not to be had by the possession of goods that derive commercial value from natural scarcity, but only those that derive it from the labor required for their production, nor is the wealth experience to be had by the *possession* of any goods, but only by the *production* of goods. And it is only the worker in material goods that has the wealth experience and not the man who appropriates those goods by trade, or earns them as the reward of his song or his wisdom. The good human experience which this teacher extols with impressive eloquence is a reality, but is it the exclusive possession of the producer of material goods, or shall we say that man discovers himself only in action, not in sleep or any negative state, that he realizes himself only in the fulfilment of his intention by his deed, and that whatever the nature of the deed he has the same essential satisfaction? Is not this self-sense of a functioning personality in its

¹Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 450 ff.

most essential quality the same kind of experience in the case of a carpenter helping to build a house, a scholar helping to build a science, or a statesman helping to build a constitution? If so, it is far from being the peculiar joy and dignity of those who are occupied in shaping material things for human uses, it is rather the common joy of *those who work*, and behold in the fruits of their labor the fulfilment of their intention.

The position of Professor Small, which was just noted, may have resulted from connecting economic satisfaction with the "instinct for workmanship." This suggests the general question of the relation between instincts and satisfactions. Instinctive action regularly includes an emotional phase. Thus the instinct of flight includes the emotion of fear, and the instinct of self-display includes the emotion of elation. The same variety of instinctive emotion may be either painful or pleasurable, according as the instinctive activity is obstructed or goes triumphantly to its object; and some varieties of instinctive emotion are predominantly painful, as fear, and others predominantly pleasurable, as elation.¹ Since the same instinctive emotion may be either painful or pleasurable, and some instinctive emotions are characteristically painful, it is clear that the instinctive emotions, as such, do not coincide with the satisfactions. It is the purpose of the instincts to secure survival, not joy. And the instinctive actions which are felt as fear, disgust, and anger are as necessary to survival on the instinctive level as pleasure and pleasurable activity.

Yet since instinctive actions are often pleasurable it is possible to note the kind of pleasure likely to be found in the functioning of any instinct. Thus the functioning of the food and sex instincts carry *physical* pleasures. Activities of the gregarious, parental, self-assertive, and loyalty instincts (granting that all these instincts exist) carry *social* pleasures. The *personal* satisfactions may be had in any course of action that the individual consciously adopts. They are particularly strong in connection with actions that objectify the fulfilment of one's intention in visible results, either in material things fashioned to the will of the actor or in the changed activities of other men. It is, I think, in controlling the activities

¹ Compare McDougal, *Social Psychology*, p. 48.

of other men that the sense of personal power is greatest, but because the sense of personal power comes also in exercising control over material things, therefore personal satisfaction is to be had in connection with the functioning of the acquisitive or hoarding and of the workmanship or constructive instinct (again granting the existence of such instincts). Psychologists have familiarized us with the fact that the self-thought includes whatever we include in our habitual description of self, and we have observed that self-satisfaction may rest on base as well as on noble grounds. The miser's self-satisfaction rests upon the thought of himself as rich. If he were impoverished his sense of identity would dwindle, and he might even go crazy, like Silas Marner when he lost his hoard.

It might be a pretty adequate statement to say that the food-getting instinct plus the collecting or hoarding instinct plus the workmanship or constructive instinct together constituted the *original* economic motive—or rather motives; but instinctive promptings soon become complicated with calculated aims of every sort, so that we have been forced to say that there is no specific economic motive because motives of every kind prompt economic activity.

Intellectual pleasure is found in the functioning of the instinct of curiosity, and here is the closest co-ordination between a particular instinct and a specific satisfaction.

The aesthetic pleasures, on the other hand, seem to be the most pervasive of all, that is to say, they seem to be quite divorced from the functioning of any particular instinct.

WORK, ALTRUISM, AND RIGHTEOUSNESS

All the values of life may be realized in work, or rather values of every kind. Work includes the zestful exercise of our powers, physical or intellectual, it very commonly includes an aesthetic element, it is a means of communication and co-operation with our kind and wins their recognition and esteem, and in work we see our own worth, power, and mastery proved and objectified before our minds. Moreover, work is purposeful, and contains not merely present realization of every kind but also hope and anticipation,

not only joy in the working but also joy in the product taking shape beneath the hands, or in the remoter end to which the labor is the means. And finally work is commonly of use to others and so secures the altruistic reduplication of satisfaction.

Some would say that the experience of altruism is a distinct value-element in life. And some of these would add that to be logical we must go farther and say that the altruistic experience, being a good in itself, is as selfishly sought as any other, thus arriving at the paradox that there is no such thing as an unselfish motive, because the man who obeys a sympathetic prompting is gratifying the craving of his own nature as truly as he who satisfies any other appetite. The altruistic man who gives a quarter to a beggar, they say, indulges in a luxury of benevolence, and to refuse he would have to deny himself.

The man who gives a quarter to a beggar merely as a luxury to himself does not do so from any altruistic motive at all, but in part from a social motive, because he winces from the beggar's scornful dislike and misjudgment but likes his gratitude, and in part from a personal motive because he enjoys the self-approval to be bought by an act of alms-giving. But what shall we say in case his motive is truly altruistic?

The altruistic motive does not appear to correspond to an additional kind of value element in life. Altruism is a social experience, and, in so far as it has value for the one experiencing it, it has social value, and also other values that may be of every kind, since the altruist, by sympathy, enters into the physical, intellectual, aesthetic, social, or personal experiences of another. In this respect the altruistic motive may be compared with the economic motive, for as the economic motive is desire for any good that requires for its attainment the use of material means, so the altruistic motive is desire for any good to be realized in the experience of another.

The altruistic man does differ distinctly from the selfish man, in that he desires good experiences for others as well as for himself. All thinkers recognize that it is not only present well-being that supplies motive, but also, and chiefly, the idea of anticipated well-being. And as we can be moved by the mere *idea* of ex-

perience, we can be moved by the idea of experience of another. Men differ by natural endowment and by habit in the degree to which their feelings are stirred and their action governed by the thought of remote experience. Some can hardly be much moved unless they see before them the actual external conditions of the possible experience, while others are governed by far-seeing aims. Likewise men differ by natural endowment and by habit in the degree to which they are stirred and prompted to action by thoughts of the actual or probable experiences of others. Some who are far-sighted in their regard for their own interests are obtuse to the interests of others; but to be stirred in some degree both by ideas of our own future good and by ideas of the good of others is a natural exhibition of the fact that the thought of a remote experience itself produces in some degree the reaction which the actual experience would produce; and impartial reason regards all values which it can apprehend. Thus sympathy is not only a real kind of motive, it is every kind of motive in so far as it can be aroused by thought of the experience of others; every human interest that can be sought for self may be sought for others. Sympathy is the tendency to be stirred by ideas of the experiences of other persons. It is not merely one particular interest, but it draws a line around all human interests and includes them in so far as they are turned outward and not inward. When the thought of others' pain or welfare stirs us the prompting is normally reinforced by the feeling of sociability—which requires only the thought of a fellow-being and not necessarily the bodily presence—and also by the feeling of self-approval—which, alas, may rise with the mere thought of a generous deed or sense of a generous prompting without a real act.

It is true that the difference between the narrow man who can see and feel no good but his own, and the generous man who desires also the good of others is often largely a natural difference. And as such is no more truly a discredit to the narrow man than is inherited bodily deformity or inherited stupidity, and native responsiveness of heart is no more and no less truly a credit to the generous man than is native bodily strength or native intelligence. Many seem to think that virtue to be admirable must be

contrary to Nature; this is much like regarding only that beauty as admirable which is due to the rouge box and the curling iron. The goodness that comes with struggle is more admirable than that which comes by nature only in so far as the duty to cherish an ideal is higher than any other duty which the ideal demands, and the power to do so is the central gift of personality which makes all others attainable, and without which man is mere clay molded by circumstance, or a mere automaton with springs touched off by his environment. The gift of sympathy is part of a normal endowment, a good and beautiful possession, but of all the gifts that man may have the gift of will, or the response of attention to ideas approved by reason though held only in memory, is the core of personality.

There are two kinds of altruism, first that inborn sympathetic generosity which it is impossible for all to possess in equal degree, and second that rational altruism which, with or without emotion simply admits that facts are facts whether they are facts of my experience or of another's, and resolves to choose the course of conduct with a reasonable view to all the foreseen effects, in the experience of whomsoever those effects are realized. The inborn altruism of kind-heartedness, though infinitely precious within the radius of personal intimacy, hardly extends to all those, often of different caste and race, who are affected by our conduct in the wide circle of business and political relationships. The political boss who corrupts the institutions upon which our welfare depends, or the titanic malefactor in business may possess instinctive kindness that binds in friendship to him his partners in spoliation, but because of lack of social education and sound moral idealism he is without the rational altruism which is adequate to humanize our big impersonal relationships.

Some mistakenly identify altruism with righteousness, and some would say that without including righteousness in the list of the kinds of good to be realized in experience our enumeration is wretchedly incomplete.

Righteousness is far larger than altruism. It is true the preacher of righteousness must preach altruism, for on that side

our righteousness lamentably fails, but not on that side alone. Our private impulses fight each other down and grow into self-destroying vices as much perhaps as our self-interest fights down and overwhelms our regard for the weal of others; and good private impulses being too feeble or wholly unaroused leave life to miss the mark as often perhaps as generous impulses fail to move us.

If righteousness were merely altruism, then each of us would be morally responsible for the values to be realized by others, and none of us responsible for the values to be realized in his own experience, when the fact is that each is morally responsible in proportion to his power, and our power is greatest over the fulfillment of our own good possibilities, and those of our own household. The Golden Rule would be reduced to an absurdity if it were made to mean that I and mine shall have no more of my income or of my effort than every neighbor, to the remote Samaritan. The Golden Rule means that we must estimate the values realized in the experience of every neighbor, to the remotest, at its full worth, and instead of caring only for the good to be realized by ourselves and our nearest, we must have regard for all the interests that can be affected by our deeds, and be governed by regard for them in proportion to our power over them.

Although one's responsibility for the worth of his own life is greater than for the life of any other one, yet his responsibility and power over all the other lives he can affect may in the aggregate exceed that which he has for his own life, and the other values that may be realized by his effort may far exceed those attainable in his own experience, and he that plans his life work with exclusive regard to his own good is a recreant member of the commonwealth. If each would be guided by reference to all the values which he could affect, in proportion to his power over them then, all would work together in the attainment of a general well-being, no values being disregarded or violated, but all values sought, even though realized by the Samaritans, and at cost to ourselves. There would be no fat obesity greedily gormandizing in the presence of the living skeletons of want. Not money only but the inestimably more

precious thought, work, power, of men would be spent in the co-operative enterprise of realizing the values which none of us in isolation can attain.

Righteousness is not mere altruism, nor is it mere triumph over self-destroying vices, nor is it mere pursuit of those higher values of our own lives which are most likely to be disregarded, but it includes all of these. Righteousness is not any separate additional good, any sixth kind of value attainable in life, but it is the attainment of all life's values. Unrighteousness is disproportion and disharmony, which exist when some forms of good, some desirable experiences are sought, out of their proper place, and beyond their due bounds, while other values are disregarded and violated and destroyed.

The effort to be righteous, merely to be righteous, as if righteousness were a separate good, easily if not inevitably becomes vain Pharisaism. The real pursuit of righteousness is following each common duty and fulfilling the requirements of each relationship, it is the embodiment of honest idealism and moral consistency. Honest idealism is inseparable from moral consistency, the consistency that demands the unflinching look, with open eyes at life's good, hard, possibilities, demands the habitual daily renewal of attention to the sane and total vision, and that carries the vision over into conduct, building up the weak and broken places in life's edifice. Thus is attained that symmetrical completeness of life, both as a result fulfilled in one's own rich and varied experience and as a causal factor in the common social process, which is righteousness.

As work is a concrete experience in which many value elements unite to make it a chief source of human satisfaction, so also in the pursuit of righteousness, or idealism, which includes work, all elements of satisfaction combine. It brings not only the satisfaction of a noble self-sense, but also an aesthetic joy in the beauty of the heavenly vision increasingly discerned and realized in common acts. And it brings also an ardor of devotion in whatever activity the ideal requires and a sense of fellowship with all high souls and even the sympathy of heaven itself with our humblest striving—if there be in heaven any sympathy with man or any

knowledge of or interest in any phenomenon that is within the compass of the world we know, it must be that heaven's interest is in consciousness realizing itself according to the laws of its being—and especially idealism gives to every other good regarded an added value by seeing it as a part of a system of good. Each common deed discloses its importance in proportion as its relations are discerned, and it is seen as part of that harmonious fulfilment of the whole of life, both individual and social, which is righteousness.

The desire for a reasonable harmony, not only between the parts and properties of one's life, but also between one's life and the whole of things, is by some persons of insight regarded as one of those deep cravings of our nature, unrecognized and undefined like all instinctive cravings, until its proper object is discovered. Thus Gustav Ratzenhofer¹ enumerates as the five fundamental interests of human beings: first, the reproductive interest; second, the nutritive interest; third, interest in the excellence and completeness of the self-conscious self; fourth, interest in the well-being of every other person actually accepted as an associate (though for the narrow mind that circle is but small, the interest in those whom it includes, he says, is as real and as natural to man as any, though perhaps less strong); and fifth, the "transcendental" interest of which he says that, whether the intellectual background be religious faith or philosophic thought, any consciousness that has attained a certain fulness of development includes a sense of dependence upon the great whole of being, and a desire for harmonious relations as a part of the whole; and that this interest which may be delayed or pushed aside by other interests may also reinforce certain interests, and together with these subdue the rebellious promptings and bring the life of man into harmony within itself as well as into harmony with the whole world.

We never comprehend the whole of life, still less the whole of the universe, but we need not comprehend the whole to fit the whole. We only need to fit into the relationships that come within the circle of the information possible to us, and these shade away into the vaster unity of Nature which we do not discern. We

¹ *Die sociologische Erkenntniss*, p. 64.

fit the whole as the cog fits the gear, the gear the shaft, the shaft the power that drives the whole.

THE INTELLIGIBLE IMPERATIVE

In many minds the old foundation for a life of worth and dignity has crumbled, the old fountain of earnestness and noble zeal has dried up, for the typical son of the twentieth century the categorical imperative is no more. If that foundation was sand where is the rock? The only unassailable basis for an intelligently conducted life is sane general apprehension of life's values and the relation of our conduct to their realization.

As the thought of a single anticipated experience may move us to a single act, so the most general survey of human weal and woe which our experience and imagination enable us to make may stir us more effectually. It is true, the small concrete instances completely presented to the mind may stir us more directly and emotionally than any general survey of life's values. Yet the comparatively unemotional admission that the whole is greater than that part which moves us so will incite the well-trained man to fulfil the requirements of the larger vision. If the emotion that we feel at a single instance were multiplied by the whole number of instances of weal and woe, we should be overwhelmed and driven mad. The emotion that is aroused in us by a single instance serves to propel us in activities calculated to ward off similar instances of evil or to secure similar instances of good in a thousand repetitions. Moreover the realization that the world can be delivered from chaos and its rich possibilities fulfilled only as men act upon these general perceptions of reason, produces in the well-trained man the support of feeling for these reasonable demands, and a revulsion of feeling against disobedience to them. Further, our own self-sense reinforces this prompting, and one rebels at the thought that *he* should fail to be one of those who play the reasonable part. The motive of moral consistency adds its propulsion to any recognized requirement, but the generalized social imperative is peculiarly adapted to be reinforced by the whole power of that motive. Such causes may arouse in us not merely the prompting to a single act, but to a life of reasonable purpose.

The motive thus inspired is the prompting of the general conclusion of practical reason. Every practical judgment is hypothetical: if I put my hand in the fire I shall be burned; I shrink from burning, therefore I shrink from the act which would involve such consequences. If I follow one course I shall add to the sum of evil; if I follow the other I shall add to the sum of good and be a part of the force that makes for the fulfilment of the good possibilities of man. We all want the general good to be secured, but if the boat laden with the hopes of us all comes duly to harbor it will be because each one pulls an oar. Can I be boring holes in the bottom of the boat while others row? No force is adequate to hold each man in his place save each man's perception of his own duty; no law will suffice but the law of freedom, in which each one is a law unto himself. At the same time the lawlessness of one undermines the fidelity of others while each faithful soul is a center of soundness—this is the salt which saves the world. It is the sight of the self-imposed fidelity of the faithful that keeps alive man's faith in man wherever that faith does not die. The more others do not see or seeing do not obey the law of our common life the more cause for the fidelity of the one. Where others prove unfaithful he will fail of the ends which by their co-operation he might have reached, but failing so, though at the stake or on the cross, he will be a savior. Therefore let each so play his part, that if all should play their parts likewise, the good possibilities of the group in which he moves, and of humanity, would be fulfilled. There is no other way to save the world. The generalized rational, or hypothetical, imperative has all the majesty without the incomprehensibility of the categorical imperative.

It has been said that there is no sanction in reason for doing good to another at cost to the doer, and that all altruism depends upon a non-rational supernatural sanction. But is that not an abysmal absurdity? If my action affects the welfare of another as well as my own, then to act in disregard of his welfare is to choose my course in disregard of a part of its consequences, to "reason" while deliberately ignoring a part of the pertinent facts, and to be governed not by reference to the facts of the case but by emotional partiality. It is to claim that good is good only

when realized by myself, and that the only suffering is my suffering, for if the good and the suffering of others are real they cannot be ignored in a rational balancing of the consequences of conduct. This is the major premise of justice: the equal reality of good and of harm, in one person or in another, not the equal extent but the equal reality as far as it extends—justice is built by reason upon this premise. And he is not just nor reasonable who affirms the equal reality of good and harm between his two neighbors, but not between himself and one of them. If, when judging between my two neighbors, A and B, I must perceive that good and harm are equally real in the experience of both, then the fact of that equality does not evaporate and become non-existent when A is judging between himself and B. He alone is just who can enforce justice between himself and his neighbor.

The real reason why some thinkers hold that there is no rational sanction for righteousness is that they regard it as axiomatic that sacrifice is never reasonable. But in fact sacrifice is never duty unless it is reasonable, that is, unless a sufficiently far-seeing and impartial balancing of values would show that from the sacrifice a net gain in experience-values can be anticipated. To say that sacrifice is not reasonable from the point of view of the actor is the same as saying that the actor is expected always to take a partial, a one-sided, an unreasonable view, swayed by his own private interest and denying the equal reality of the interests of others. Impulsive instinctive and unreasoned goodness, precious as it is, will not suffice to save the world.

The conflict between the private interest of the good man and the demands of righteousness upon him is mitigated or resolved by two considerations: First, in proportion as society becomes wise enough to identify its benefactors and its malefactors, it makes the way of transgressors hard, and rewards the well-doer with approval, esteem, promotion, and advantage. It is true that society does not yet dispense its penalties and its favors with wisdom and justice, but it has made progress in that direction and will make more. Second, in making sacrifice the good man does only what he knows any man in his place is reasonably bound to do, and should he refuse he would violate his own reason, and

murder his own personality; seeking his life he would lose it. He would lose his self-respect, would cease to be the man that he could countenance, would sacrifice his own peace and worth, and his zest in the pursuit of life's aim, and that loyalty which is the heart of the life of a social being. Every true man knows that it is war time, and for the true man in war time sacrifice is a condition of the highest happiness. He is happier playing his part in the strife of good and evil, just as the loyal Dodson felt that it was but natural for him to ride behind to toils and perils when his Montmorency went to war, and he was far happier so than he would have been skulking at home.

No follower of the rational social imperative can ever think that it imposes a merely negative responsibility requiring him to do no harm. The source of life's reasonable motives is not merely that there is harm to be prevented but also in the fact that there is always potential good to be achieved, and that this potential good must largely be a co-operative social achievement, in which each man's work and the suggestions emanating from his personality play a part. The logic of the generalized hypothetical imperative requires him so to act as to fit into the general method of the social realization of good. In entering upon any situation in life, in joining a moonlight stroll or a parlor festival, in accepting a place on an athletic team, or membership in a home, or taking employment with a firm, or engaging a workman, or opening an office in a city, it is reasonable to ask both what can I get out of this situation and what can I put into it. Not to ask the latter as well as the former question is to be base and parasitic. Every social situation is a co-operative undertaking in which each one depends upon the rest and must be depended on, which each one can make worse and each one can make better. This realization makes men real. Moved by it one cannot make goods "just to sell," one will not speak or write moved only by the thought of the reaction of his public upon himself with praise or blame, reward or penalty, but he will speak and write and work for truth and righteousness.

Whatever may be true of women, with men it is the generalized social imperative rather than particular sympathy that evokes

the highest devotion, and lives of consistent and dependable usefulness. Saints, missionaries, and reformers are not likely to be persons whose benevolent life-purpose depends wholly upon sympathy with particular instances that chance to come within their observation, but they are likely rather to be persons who can feel enthusiasm for a general social campaign. So also is the ordinary good and fit citizen of an advanced and advancing society. Personal, as distinguished from social, sympathy, will not do; it is too short-sighted, it can feel a social pin prick, but it cannot see a thirteen-inch gun aimed across the social battlefield. Milk men who would die rather than strangle one pink baby have murdered innocents like Herod. Corporators who would passionately defend the property rights of an acquaintance have appropriated millions for which they have made no return. In the mind of the good man the generalization of the requirements of humanity must go beyond the particular instance. Suppose certain corporations are bound to use money enough to kill a bill which is pending before a legislature, and that the bill ought to be killed. Shall the legislator say: "I will take the thousand dollars offered for my negative vote; it will make no difference except that the money will be in my pocket instead of some other"? Or shall he say: "Bribery and the perversion of representative government can be stopped only when legislators refuse bribes; there is vastly more at stake than this strike bill, all strike bills, fit city charters, administration of health laws that could save thousands of lives annually, all laws, the general promotion of welfare realizable by pure legislation and administration, all are at stake—more than men have died for on many a battlefield is at stake. Progress waits for soundness; it is for me to help perpetuate the existing rottenness by being a part of it or to be one center of soundness and give back to the man who offers me the bribe his faith in men. It may do no good in the present legislation, but my sacrifice will be part of the cost of the coming better day." This is the meaning of the saying of Christ, "If any man will come after me let him take up his cross and follow me"—let him pay his part of the cost as I pay mine on my cross.

Enough of that cost has already been paid so that we have

begun to live in "a pleasure economy" We have still a "submerged tenth," and woman's lot is as yet too hard or too vacant, and in every broad social class there are inestimable possibilities of good still unfulfilled. Yet where reasonable bodily health exists a clear margin of good experience over evil is, for the great majority of us, attainable. But, in our pursuit of good, will our energies be guided by a wise conception of that harmony of diverse experiences in which The Good consists? Instinct does not equip us with the needed guidance, instinct affords adequate direction for the simple life of a lower animal, but not for the complex task of human life. The inborn tendencies of every generation require to be reinforced by the experience and reflection of those who have gone before. Each generation sets out with the illusion that brief and superficial pleasures are the substance of happiness, like children that, given one wish by the fairy godmother, desire barrels of candy. Inexperience does not know that it is in the zestful exercise of our powers and the deep tide of lasting social and personal satisfactions and the harmony of life which omits no good experience but includes each in due subordination to life's ideal completeness that our true fulfilment consists. Painfully men struggle for vanities, and pitifully they sell their birthright for a mess of savory steaming pottage, soon devoured; ruefully they gaze upon the ashes that fill their hands, ashes into which the apples of Sodom crumbled at their touch. From the time when Solomon, having taken every "pleasure" that his royal power could seize, cried in the end, "Vanity of vanities, all is vanity and vexation of spirit," down to Goethe and his Faust the same old lesson has been learned by succeeding generations of men.

Why is Faust regarded as the supreme literary expression of the wonderful century of literature in which it was produced? Because it so masterfully treats the supreme question, "What in life is good?" and gives an answer which commends itself to that mature judgment of the discerning which is the final test of literary values. And this is the answer given: Faust tries the pleasures of knowledge, license, wealth, power, glory, beauty, and mastery over Nature, but finds no hour in which to say: "Tarry for thou

art fair," no hour of satisfaction, until at last he finds it in the sense that his work is of use; he discovers life in useful work.

Only action is life, only purposeful action is life in full tide, only a purpose that is of use, that is real, that is worthy of our powers, that disregards no values it affects, that weaves into the web of human realization, of which our own experience is a conscious part, ever truly and fully satisfies a rational, social, being. Such action is work, and such work is play, not "child's play," but the free harmonious play of all the resources of our being.

Work, home, friends, health—these are among the symbols of life abundant with its five-fold satisfactions: physical, aesthetic, intellectual, social, and personal. To be interested is to be alive and active, not to be interested is, to a conscious being, death or stupor. To have an aim worthy of one's possibilities, a sincerity at peace with one's own reason, a loyalty to that social whole which is immeasurably greater than any single self and membership in which conditions the worth of every individual life—these are essentials of a complete human existence, the experience of a true son of man, joint heir in man's rich inheritance and, with all true men and that supreme power which works through Nature, a joint savior of one's kind.